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Comes now the Appellant, Michael Landesf by and through his 
counsel of iecuni, ami respect tu J J y submits I he In I lowing rep] y to 
Respondent's Brief: 
STATEMEN 
1. On or about November 15, 1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, 
Ltd, (Bagel Nosh) applied for a SBA guarantied loan from Respondent 
in the amount of $300,000. Under the terms of that loan, which is 
governed by Title 13 of the Code of Fedei: a] Reg til at I ons, the SBA 
agreed to participate in the loan and guarantied ninety percent 
(90%) of the outstanding obligation Respondent. At the 
time Bagel Nosh appl i ed for • - .-••,.,. 
were the majority stockholders of Bagel Nosh. As part of the loan 
transaction, Appellant and the Seftels were required to execute 
personal «ju«n ant i eh presented on ,SHA''i I'm1" 14tl HI.J LBfaiitf I MIS* 
deeds on condominiums the parties owned In Snowbird, Utah, as 
security for the guaranties. 
2. On December 24, 1979, the SBA guarantied loan was approved 
and a loan agreement and promissory note executed by Bagel Nosh in 
favor" of Respondent., K „ 1 0 5 - I (J 6 . -: 
~ The proceeds of the loan were used by Bagel Nosh for the 
i equipping of a Bagel Nosh restaurant in Park City, 
ACS/ms 2 
Utah. 
4. Under the terms of the Form 148 guaranties, Appellant and 
the Seftels agreed to guaranty payment of the total loan amount to 
the SBA and Respondent as joint obligees. R. 129, 133. As 
additional collateral for the loan, Bagel Nosh granted Respondent 
a security interest in all its equipment and assets. 
5. Following disbursement of the loan proceeds, Bagel Nosh 
constructed its restaurant facilities and began operations. 
Appellant is not a resident of the State of Utah and did not have 
any responsibility for the management or operation of the 
restaurant. As with many start up companies, Bagel Nosh 
experienced its share of problems and eventually went into default 
on its payments to Respondent. 
6. Bagel Nosh's initial default on the obligation led to the 
restructuring of the agreement between the parties. The 
restructuring was reduced to wiriting in a document entitled Loan 
Restructure Agreement, dated March 30, 1983. R. 137. That 
agreement provided among other things for modification of the 
original loan and guaranty agreements. In conjunction with this 
restructuring, no new personal guaranties were executed by 
Appellant and the Seftels. If given the opportunity at trial, 
Appellant will prove that any guarantied liability was extinguished 
at that time. 
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7. After experiencing continued financial problems, on 
November 8, 1 9134, Bagel Nosh fi led a peti tion for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. 187 As a 
debtor-in-possession, Bagel Nosh continued for a period of ti me to 
make payments to Respondent pursuant to the terms of the Loan 
Restructure Agreement. 
8. In an effort to protect their interests, Appellant and the 
Seftels initiated the present actio) against Respondent to 
determine the exi stence and extent, i : • • :: £ thei r ] iabi 1 ity as 
guarantors of the Bagel Nosh obligation. In response to 
Plaintiff's complaint, Respondent filed a counterclaim under which 
9 Following limited discovery by Appellant, on July 25, 
] 4Hb, Heiipniiidc'iit ii Lrdl i l s Motion toi Summary udgment against 
Appellant and the Seftels. 
] 0 I:i i response to Respondent s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Appellant filed a Rep] y Memorandum i n which it asserted that 
Respondent had failed to join the SBA, an indispensable party, in 
i ts attempted enforcement of the original guaranty agreements. R 
208-222. 
February 4, 1987, Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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Timothy R. Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision granting Summary 
Judgment in favor of Respondent on all issues. R. 308-313. On the 
issue of the joinder of the SBA, Judge Hanson explained: 
"Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, the 
Small Business Administration, has not been joined. That defense 
is without merit. In the first instance, the defense has not been 
pled, but additionally, the SBA is not under the present 
interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable party to 
this action." R. 311. 
12. When the indispensable party issue was addressed on 
Appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its opinion, recognized that the 
SBA was a ninety percent (90%) participating lender and that the 
guaranties which formed the basis of Appellant's alleged liability 
were executed on SBA forms in favor of both the SBA and Respondent 
as "co-lenders." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 943 
(Utah App. 1989). 
13. Following entry of the district court's partial final 
judgment and decree of foreclosure, on June 4, 1987, Appellant and 
the Seftels filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a supersedeas bond 
in the total amount of the judgment, plus interest. 
14. While the present Appeal was before the Court of Appeals, 
on March 17, 1988, the Seftels filed for relief under Chapter 7 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy 
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Court for the District of Utah rent raJ I) i v i K I on On November J 7, 
1986, the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy was converted to a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter r the Bankruptcy Code, On April 15, 
1987, an order was eritt L-
 t ne Urn I ec;l St dt.es bankruptcy Judge 
closing the estate of Bagel Nosh, 
l)n Octobej 6
 l( 19 813, which wait iiiorf than a yeai aftei I he 
judgment was entered i n the present case, Respondent allegedly-
received from the SBA an assignment of all of its right, title and 
in terest i i :t tl le guarai it;j agreements . (Af £i dav i 1: of Stan Nakano, 
attached to Respondent's Memorandum in Support of its Motion as 
Exhibit "A"). This alleged assignment was effected by the 
endorsement of the guaranty agreements by Stan Nakano, acting as 
the District Director of the SBA i n the District of Utah. 
(Affidavit of M. A. Allem, attached to Respondent's Memorandum as 
Exhibit "B"). Pri or to thi« alleged assignment of the SBA's 
interest, Respondent had advanced the position that the SBA had no 
interest I n the obJ :I gati on evidenced by the g uaranty agreement and 
had no direct claim or cause of action against the Appellant. 
(Respondent's Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorar I , p 9 • ] 0). 
18, On January 1989, the Court of Appeals issued its 
decision In its r: , .: . • je Court of Appeals held that, the 
district court committed error in its analysis of the joinder of 
the SBA but concluded that the fact the SBA had given Respondent 
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written authorization to enforce the obligation rendered the error 
harmless. 
17. The condominium pledged by the Seftels as collateral for 
their guaranty was subject to a first mortgage loan from Crossland 
Savings. Following the filing of the Seftels' bankruptcy petition, 
Crossland issued notice of a foreclosure sale of the property 
scheduled for February 23, 1989. Prior to the Seftels' bankruptcy, 
Appellant had been granted a third mortgage interest in the 
Seftel's condominium to secure the Seftels' portion of the 
supersedeas bond. On February 10, 1989, Respondent filed a motion 
in the United States Bankruptcy Court to stop the scheduled 
foreclosure. On February 21, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court denied 
Respondent's motion. 
18. Following the denial of its motion to stop the 
foreclosure sale, on February 22, 1989, Respondent and the SBA 
entered into an agreement whereby the SBA purchased the first 
mortgage interest, substituted itself as trustee, and proceeded 
with the foreclosure sale. (Answer of Capital City Bank in Michael 
Landes v. Capital City Bank, et al., Civil No. 89-0902926, in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah). Prior 
to the purchase of the Crossland Mortgage, Appellant gave 
Respondent and the SBA notice of an agreement between Respondent 
and Crossland whereby Appellant agreed to cure the default and 
reinstate the mortgage. 
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19. un L aorning ml fVbiuat'y -M, I "III1!, A|i(*'ll<ii 1 hi rniqht 
a motion for t ssuanc< temporary restraining order on for 
hearing before the Honorable Timothy lanson. At that hearing, 
the SBA contested the mo I inn by 
i> w • a party JII the action and therefore not subject to the 
Court s jurisdiction or the stay imposed by t he supersedeas bond 
W"l ' - m-ui I I »:*i I in i II! I n II i f i i i ) I I , | I | » * i l i M { j i i f 
counsel for the SBA explained to the Court the relationship between 
the SBA and Respondent and stated that the SBA had ~ ontinuing 
Respondent receive n v t \ percent (90% monies 
Respondent collects unde? *c judgment Transcript of Hearing 
aated February 23j -1 989, 
p 3 1 ) . . • ....-
let count's denial Appellant's 
motion for a temporary restraining order on February 23, 1989, the 
SBA proceeded with the foreclosm • SnttPl'f. 
dominium Respondent. The - . property 
eliminated Appellant's junior lien position in that property. 
.Ml mi 1in Mdy "'"i" i I'JH'h Appellant filed a separate proceeding 
against Respondent and the SBA In the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Sta 
that action f Appellant seeks damages incurred as a result t -
ACS/ms 8 
foreclosure sale of the Seftels' condominium. In its answer to 
Appellant's complaint, Respondent admitted that it entered into an 
agreement with the SBA on or b€jfore February 22, 1989, whereby the 
SBA purchased the Crossland Note and the Seftel-Crossland Trust 
Deed. (Answer of Capital City Bank, in Civil No. 89-0902926) 
(Certified copies of the complaint and answer in Civil No. 89-
0902926 are attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). Therefore, 
notwithstanding its alleged prior assignment of all its right, 
title and interest in the guaranty agreements, the SBA continues 
to be actively involved with Respondent in all actions relative to 
the obligation in question. 
22. Appellant filed his petition for Writ of Certiorari with 
this Court on March 2, 1989. Appellant's petition was granted by 
the Court on June 12, 1989 and on August 7, 1989, the Brief of 
Appellants was filed. On October 10, 1989, Respondent filed its 
Brief in this matter. 
FIRST ARGUMENT 
THE PRESENT APPEAL, HAS NOT BEEN RENDERED 
MOOT BY THE ALLEGED ASSIGNMENT 
Respondent argues the alleged post-judgment assignment somehow 
renders the present appeal moot. Because the SBA remains the real 
party in interest in relation to its ninety percent (90%) 
participation interest, the assignment has not changed the 
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c i renins LaiK'es rind I, r1 -> in i »l e l m i incited t lh v i "cim 1 rove ir sy p* esenie Il M " 
this appeal Ii addition, the assignment has not rendered the 
relief request impossible or of no legal affect. 
Respondent argues that if this Court were li» determine that 
the SBA should have been joined , then joinder would be meaningless 
because o assignment •- interest of the SBA Respondent 
misconceives the impact of this alleged assignment. 
* undamental premise ot , •+ >t assignment is the concept 
that assignee takes nothing more assignment than his 
A .; . .
 t . • . r i " l l i ill *I> If : ItQ Il Ill I , ail , 
C -.. w y- w j **.A->_C- •» « J W w A i t u t j . »- w _ » 1 1 1 M jp I I I II 
1980 . the assignment 4 ^ interest ontract gives the 
assignee same rights as the assignor under the contract and 
J ack G. Parson Companies v Nield, 1 , 
1133 (Utah 1985); First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 62 1 P.2d 683, 686 
(Utah 1980) A nd, wii i ] e the assignee becomes the real party 
i in i e r e s t 1111 I u w i n .j a u a ] i c:i somp] ete as si * . 
the right to all set offs and defenses that he may have or may 
acquire against the assignor prior notification • :i)f I: .he 
asslijiiinr'i i See Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson Trucking Co., 
458 P.2d 873, 876 (Utah 1969); Lvnch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464f 
468 (Utah 1962). 
Appellant has maintained that the SBA has an unsecured claim 
against him and seeks an opportunity to litigate that claim and 
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present his defenses to the claim. The fact that the Respondent 
may hold the SBA's claim does not eliminate the nature of that 
unsecured claim nor the Appellant's legal right to present any and 
all defenses to it in a judicial proceeding. 
Therefore, the alleged assignment of the SBA's claim against 
Appellant, even if valid, does not moot the case because the relief 
requested, to witf reversal and remand to the district court for 
adjudication of the SBA's unsecured claim, will aff€*ct the rights 
of the litigants and the requested relief is not impossible and 
will have clear legal effect. 
SECOND ARGUMENT 
THE PRIOR JUDGMENT IS VOID AND THEREFOR A NULLITY 
This Court, and a majority of other courts have held that the 
mandatory joinder of a necessary party under Rale 19(a) is 
jurisdictional in nature. See Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 
(Utah 1987). The jurisdictional nature of the joinder requirements 
of Rule 19 have led courts to hold that an order entered without 
jurisdiction over a necessary party is null and void. See e.g., 
In re Adoption of Ledbetter, 465 N.E. 2d 962, 964 (111. App. 4 
Dist. 1984). 
Respondent does not challenge or contest this basic rule of 
law. Rather, it simply ignores the jurisdictional nature of Rule 
19 and argues that the void judgment should be validated by this 
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Court because of the allegedly post-judgment assignment. 
ii L.ne Liiai court did not have jurisdict *r. in-
decision, a post-judgment assignment cannot cur* 
jurisdictional defect any more than valid service upon a Defendant 
after a judgment was IMIU»M*(1 WMIIM M-MHIHI ii |IIIIH, vnnl ||!ii;it)iiN nl 
valid and enforceable. 
THIRD ARGUMENT 
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT APPELLANT HAVE AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND DIRECTLY AGAINST 
THE SBA'S CLAIMS 
A basic precept r t V* law surrounding mandatory joinder and 
L endant has the i: i gh I: to 
assen d defenses he might have against the real party 
interest. See Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952). xn 
faii[n)j<ji f nl in I I mi iiii i if mnntnes"!, R e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t b o t h l o w e r 
courts have ruled that Appellant has no defenses under the 
absolute , unconditional guaranty. 
Trt relation to Capital 's claim to repayment * >ercent 
(10%) of the outstanding obligation i\ iiii: dssf ^ 
oil ret I However -. r the district court nor the Court of 
Appeals has litigated that or any other issue in relation to the 
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SBA's claim for repayment of ninety percent of the obligation.1 
Rule 19 requires that the Appellant be given the opportunity 
to adjudicate any and all defenses that he might have to the SBA's 
claim. At this point in the proceedings he has not been afforded 
that opportunity. It is not this Court's place to determine what 
defenses the Appellant has to the SBA's claim. That issue 
encompasses questions of fact and law that were not before the 
district court and are not the subject of this Appeal. 
Fundamental due process of law requires a defendant be given 
a fair opportunity to present any and all defenses that he might 
xWhile Respondent does not expressly argue the issue, the 
basis of this part of its mootness claim is that somehow Appellant 
is precluded from litigating its defenses against the SBA. Because 
the claims of the SBA and Respondent are different, the only legal 
basis for such preclusion would be collateral estoppel. This Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals have previously recognized that 
application of the doctrine of claim preclusion requires the 
existence of the following four factors; (1) the issue decided in 
the prior adjudication was identical to the one presented in the 
new action; (2) there was a final judgment on the mcsrits; (3) the 
party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party in the prior adjudication; and (4) the issue in the 
first case was competently, fully, and fairly litigated. See 
Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978); Schaer v. 
State By & Through Utah Dept. , 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983). 
Even if some of the issues present in the adjudication of the SBA's 
claim are identical to those found in the present litigation, the 
absence of the real party in interest in this litigation means that 
those issues were not competently, fully and fairly litigated. 
Therefore, collateral estoppel could not be imposed to eliminate 
the Appellant's right to adjudicate the various issuers against the 
real party in interest. Any other application of collateral 
estoppel would completely undermine the rules of mandatory joinder 
and real party in interest. 
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have against the true holder of " - - iction. 
Appellant has been afforded that opportun 
case Miit 1. tJei y t hr Appellant that 
opportunity because <•* ^ alleged post-judgment assignment of the 
real part} - interest s •: - *>• Such a res-. ••• - *. I c I i in • >l ; 
*. )r more basic 
requirements of aae process. 
FOURTH ARGUMENT 
THE SBA IS STILL THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
The dlleged assignment, which is a sham and fraud, hah nut 
divested the SBA - claim - ninety percent (9U*) 'M"" 
outstanding obligate iidered Respondent the real 
2Appellant's defenses against the claim of the SBA include the 
fact that the Loan Restructure Agreement dated March 3, 1983, 
altered the terms of the original loan agreement. One aspect of 
that restructuring was that the Appellant and the Seftel's would 
enter into new guaranty agreements under the terms of which they 
would guaranty the total amount of the obligation to Respondent. 
Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the Loan Restructure Agreement
 # 
the original guaranty agreements, which included both Respondent 
and the SBA, would be superseded by new guaranties running only to 
the Respondent. 
Whether the original guaranty agreements have been replaced 
or superseded pursuant to the Loan Restructure Agreement 
constitutes a question of fact that was never addressed by the 
trial court or the Court of Appeals. If Appellant is allowed to 
litigate the claim of the SBA under the original guaranty 
agreements that factual claim will be presented and considered by 
the district court and, finally, Appellant will be allowed his 
opportunity to litigate the substantive issues involved in this 
case against the real party i n i nterest to wi tf the SBA. 
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party in interest as to the SBA's ninety percent (90%) 
participation interest.3 
As this Court explained in Stromquist v. Cokavne, 646 P.2d 
746, 747 (Utah 1982), the right to commence and continue a legal 
proceeding depends on the Plaintiff suffering an injury to a 
legally protected right for which the law provides a remedy. The 
only legally protected right which the Respondent has is the right 
to repayment of ten percent (10%) of the outstanding obligation. 
That is the amount of money which it loaned to the original obligor 
and that is the amount of money which it will lose if neither that 
debtor nor a guarantor satisfies the obligation. 
If a claim has been assigned in full, the assignee is the real 
party in interest with the right to maintain the action on that 
claim. See E.C.L. v. Denver Dept of Social Services, 742 P.2d 955, 
956 (Colo. App. 1987). Lvnch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d at 468. 
However, if the assignment fails to transfer titled to the 
assignor's rights, the assignment is not valid and the assignee is 
not the real party in interest. See Farrell Const. Co. v. 
Jefferson Parish, 693 F.Supp. 490, 497 (E.D. La. 1988). As the 
Court explained in Farrell: 
A plaintiff can recover only by proving that he himself is 
entitled to prevail on the cause of action alleged. It is not 
enough that he prove that some other persons, not a party to 
3In its fifth argument Respondent admits that the SBA is 
entitled to receive ninety percent (90%) of everything that it 
recovers from Appellant notwithstanding the alleged assignment. 
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the case, would h*-:- entitled • i ^ i M\M- ry i \\ n cause ftf 
acti on. Ir* •••' < • 
Respondent admits ii i its present statements of facts thri* ' "* 
SBA - ™ ". obligee under the . • IIJUTI forms m e 
bas. >e J 1 ai it s alleged liability. The SBA ninety 
percent 10%) participant tr- obligation xn 
Throughout these proceed! - ^^ -^^=> 
•IMUISI iobi1 i agent 01 the SBA. In fact, pursuant to • agreement 
between those parties, Respondent must pay ninety < u£ 
everything it collec* judgment to the SBA.4 
Therefore, Respondent is still acting n 
the collects IUII wliu.'h LS due and owing * the SBA.5 
40n February 23, 1989, in direct contradiction to Respondent's 
prior arguments and the alleged assignment, counsel for the SBA 
explained to the district court the relationship between the SBA 
and Respondent. At the hearing, the SBA's counsel stated that 
under an agreement between the parties Respondent must deliver to 
the SBA its ninety percent (90%) share of all monies collected 
under the judgment. (A certified copy of the transcript of that 
hearing was attached as Exhibit "AM to Appellants Response to 
Respondents Mootness Motion.) 
5Because Respondent is a named obligee on the guaranty in 
question in this case, it has a claim against Appellant for 
repayment of monies it loaned to the original debtor. Respondent 
loaned ten percent (10%) of that total amount. Therefore, under 
accepted principals of law it can show a contract right to 
repayment of monies which it has lost and thus a legal claim for 
repayment of its ten percent (10%) share. That is the extent of 
its injury and the extent of its claim. By means of a trust deed 
that claim is secured by real property. 
The SBA on the other hand, has a claim under the same contract 
of guaranty for repayment of ninety percent (90%) of the 
outstanding obligation That claim, is unsecured. 
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The SBA remains the party which will receive the vast majority of 
the benefit of Respondent's present judgment and therefore remains 
the real party in interest 
FIFTH ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS 
ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN FAILING TO JOIN THE SBA 
In its second argument, Respondent contends the issue of the 
joinder of the SBA should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Appellant has argued that under the provisions of Rule 
19(a), joinder of a necessary party is mandatory rather than 
discretionary and therefore the lower court's failure to join a 
necessary party which could have been joined is not a discretionary 
act. Respondent does not contest the fact that the SBA could have 
been joined in the present action. Therefore, if the SBA is a 
necessary party, it must be joined in the present proceedings. 
Notwithstanding the mandatory joinder requirements of Rule 
19(a), Respondent argues that the district court and the Utah Court 
of Appeals did not abuse their discretion in denying the request 
for joinder of the SBA. 
The Court of Appeals found that the district court did not 
follow the analytical steps required by Rule 19 and therefore 
committed error. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district 
court had committed error by failing to consider the relevant 
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idi.'tors ant in i:i! in Unlv III mi deciding that the SBA wr*.s nut aJJ 
indispensable party. This error constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.6 
In affirming the district cour decision, the Court 
Appeals committed the same error that 
,: ir-t- rni . %^ ommitted. Rather than undertaking 
* .«• analysis required : h.. * c* ^ * Appeals merely 
concluded that had authorized 
Respondent *o guaranty, justified the 
conclusion that the SBA was ;*ww a** indispensable part 
The Appellate Court's analytical error is contained in the 
following statement: 
"If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is deemed 
vnecessary, ' a Court must then proceed to subsection (b), and 
determine whether the party i s i ndispensable , M Seftel, 767 
P.2d at 945. 
The determination that a party H i« vei^'Sdry M JPI subsection 
owed by analysis of whether or not that 
party can be joined. :i necessary party can be joined, Rule 
6It is generally recognized that an abuse of discretion can 
occur in three principal ways: (1) when a relevant factor that 
should be given significant weight is not considered; (2) when an 
irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant 
weight; and (3) when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are 
considered, but the court, in weighing these factors, commits a 
clear error of judgment. See Kern v. TXO Productions . Corp., 738 
F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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19(a) makes the joinder mandatory. If and only if the necessary 
party can not be joined must the court proceed to subsection (b), 
and determine whether the party is indispensable. 
In the present case, federal statutory provisions provide that 
the SBA may be made a party in a state court action. 15 U.S.C. 
Section 634 (b)(1). Therefore under Rule 19(a) if the SBA is a 
necessary party it must be joined. 
Both the district court and the Appellate Court's failure to 
properly analyze this issue of law and their failure to consider 
relevant factors associated with that analysis constitutes an abuse 
of discretion and reversible error. 
SIXTH ARGUMENT 
THE SBA IS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THE 
PRESENT LITIGATION 
In Respondent's third argument, it contents that the Court of 
Appeals intended to say that the SBA was not a necessary party when 
it stated that the SBA was not an indispensable party. This is a 
ridiculous claim. 
The Court of Appeals clearly outlined the two step analysis 
required by Rule 19 and recognized that "if, after the appropriate 
analysis, a party is deemed "necessary", a court must then proceed 
to subsection (b), and determine whether the party is 
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indispensable. . Seftel v. Capital City, 76 7 P.2d 941, 943 
(Utah App. 1989). This J ft Ihf only i UM- t hdl the Conn -: Appeals 
used the term "necessary" .in the text of its opinion, and this 
reference provided the analytical starting point for its discussion 
of the requirements of Ruh- Hf lv, „ How thei I can Respondent argue 
that the Court of Appeals used the terms necessary and 
indispensable interchangeable in the opinion? 
Notwithstanding Respondent's mischaracterization ; t the Court 
of Appeal's opinion, the real issue presented by tt* 
third, fourth and fifth arguments is whether the SBA ;. ^  r. 
necessary party, That issue was never addressed by the district 
court :: Court ** appeals and no findings mf fart were mevh1 in f hf 
lower -• ' -e i.o thai issue. Therefore, that issue is not 
proper before this Court. 
i ^ arguments, Respondent presents its 
case for why the SBA ri necessary party in this litigation. 
Respondent's argument that the SBA is not a necessary party 
is founded on the fact that Respondent is the holder of the 
promissory note which was ori gi rial 1 y I ssued by the principal 
debtor, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd.7 Respondent argues that as 
7Before the Court of Appeals, Respondent contended, although 
it presented no admissible evidence in support thereof, that the 
SBA had no legal interest in the guaranties, was not a party to the 
note and had not funded any portion of the ] oan Seftel v. Capital 
City, 767 P.2d at 946. 
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the holder and sole payee under the note it may enforce payment and 
discharge the note in its own name. Respondent argues further that 
the general rules regarding real party in interest do not apply in 
the context of negotiable instruments. 
Respondent's general statements of law are correct. The 
holder of a negotiable instrument, rather than its owner, may 
enforce that instrument and as the holder of the Bagel Nosh note, 
Respondent is entitled to enforce payment and discharge the note 
in its own name. 
However, Appellant is not a maker or endorser of the Bagel 
Nosh note and has no liability to Respondent or anyone else under 
that note. Rather, Appellant's potential liability to both 
Respondent and the SBA results from his execution of a separate 
guaranty agreement. And, while a question of fact remains 
concerning the enforceability of the original gueiranty agreement 
(following execution of the Loan Modification Agreement), that 
agreement was relied upon by the district court as the basis for 
Appellant's liability to Respondent. 
The original guaranty agreement is not a negotiable 
In its Brief, Respondent abandons these factual claims and 
admits that the SBA had an interest in the guaranties which it 
assigned to Respondent. Respondent also admits that the SBA is a 
ninety percent (90%) participant in the note. Thus, the SBA has 
in fact, funded ninety percent (90%) of the obligation. 
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instrument Sec,? United States v. Hunter, Sb2 F.Supp- 774, 778 (D. 
Kan. 1986); United States Etc. v. Kurtz. 525 F.Supp 734, 743 (E.D. 
Perm. 1981). Therefore, the rules -i **w i-. • vu Section 70A-3-
i J -V-J ,i a negotiable instrument 
are inapplicable to the collection of the obligation evidenced by 
this guaranty agreement. 
Respondent argues that, as holder of the note, it is the only 
party entitled to enforce the note ami the SliA ib not entitled to 
collect fui. or assert claims under the note. This may be true 
in relation : the Bagel Nosh note but it has no relevance to 
enforcement of the guaranty agreement Federal courts have 
concluded I hat an obligee's action to enforce an absolute, 
unconditional guaranty payment is distinct from any action to 
enforce the related r -oiy note See United States v. 
McAllister. 661 P-Supp. 1175. ! 177 (E,D. N.Y 1987). 
As the Court exp la i necl in .McAllister: 
"This suit (to enforce an identical SBA guaranty) seeks 
recovery under the guaranty executed by the Defendants as 
individuals, not on the note executed by the corporate entity 
Peconic Bay. Nothing in defendant's agreement conditions 
their liability on negotiation of the note. Id, 661 F.Supp. 
at 11 77 
Similarly/ in Strevell-Paterson Co., v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 
744 (Utah 1982)
 r this court held that a , v v .-. under an 
unconditional quarant \ ib independent : u*<- obligation of the 
ACS/ms 22 
original debtor. 
Therefore, the Respondent's conclusion that the SBA may not 
assert claims against Appellant through enforcement of the guaranty 
is contrary to accepted legal principals. As a named obligee on 
the guaranty agreement, the SBA has a cause of action against 
Appellant for enforcement of its portion of the obligation. 
Because the SBA is a ninety percent (90%) participant and joint 
obligee under the terms of the guaranty agreement it is a necessary 
party to the enforcement of that agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The SBA has a contract claim against Appellant. That claim 
is based on an agreement between the SBA, Respondent and Appellant 
which is memorialized in an SBA Form 148 guaranty agreement. Under 
the terms of that guaranty agreement, Appellant promised to pay to 
the SBA and Respondent, as joint obligees, a sum of money. The SBA 
Form 148 guaranty is not a negotiable instrument. Rather it is a 
simple contract the enforcement of which is governed by general 
contract law. 
Enforcement of the contract obligation between the SBA and 
Appellant is separate and distinct from any enforcement of the 
promissory note issued to Respondent by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, 
Ltd. Likewise, enforcement of the contract obligation between 
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Respondent ami Appellant is separate and distinct from Respondentrs 
enforcement of the Bagel Nosh promissory note. The separate nature 
of the joint obligee's claims against Appe]JciriI. nuclei t h^ SBA Fi>ni» 
] 48 g uaranty agreement has been defined by prior rulings of the 
Federal Courts. 
Respondent asks this Court to ignore these legal precedents 
and the simple rules -~ which should gover *^:s Court's 
determination. ^ Respondent 
argues that enforcement of the SBA Form 148 guaranty agreement can 
not be separated from enforcement ot I he Udcjel Nosh promissory 
note. Respondent re a H < * 11 is t. hat t »ec a i j s c • it 11 •» t hut* holder o f that 
promissory note, it, and n alone, can pursue enforcement of the 
contract obligation evidenced by the SBA Form 148 guaranty 
agreement. Thi *•: m e Respondent has relied 
upon throughout these proceedings is 5imply wrong. 
Realizing that it.s fundamental premise may be unfounded, 
Respondent has attempted to side step the issues presented in this 
Appeal by allegedly obtaining an assignment <.f the SBA." b .contract 
claim. Based on t.hitj alleged assignment, Respondent now claims 
that the present appeal is moot The assignment of the SBA's 
claim, even if it has been made, does haiuje the nature of that 
c . appeal. 
Appellant has a legal right to present his defenses to the 
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SBA's claim. Whether the SBA, Respondent or some other third party 
holds that claim is immaterial to Appellant's exercise of that 
legal right. Because the SBA was not a party to the lower court 
proceedings, Appellant has not been given an opportunity to defend 
directly against that claim. The alleged, post-judgment assignment 
can not eliminate Appellant's right to fully and fairly adjudicate 
that claim. 
Therefore, the SBA's post-judgment assignment of its claim is 
immaterial to the present Appeal. That assignment does not end the 
controversy between the parties and it does not render reversal of 
Respondent's judgment a meaningless act. This Appeal is not moot 
and this Court should rule on the substantive issues presented 
herein and reverse the lower court's judgment. 
Dated this 7th day of November, 1989. 
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